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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Willis deals with the question of administrative rule making unchecked by
judicial review, which has aroused such a furore in England in recent
years, with Lord Hewart leading the attack in "The New Despotism." The
bureaucracy has received more or less a clean bill of health from the
Committee on Ministers' Powers, which reported in 1932; but Mr. Willis
is not impressed with the utility of the somewhat strengthened judicial
review which the committee recommends. Determination of administrative
jurisdiction by suitable administrative tribunals holds for him no more
terrors than similar determination of their own jurisdiction by the courts.
His scholarly survey of the legislation and decisions bearing upon the
question reveals how deep-seated is the need and how numerous are the
occasions for administrative discretion in rule making no less than in other
directions.
After all the general studies and surveys of administrative control have
been taken into account, there will remain a need for intensive studies of
the functioning of particular administrative agencies. There have been a
few such studies, but no preceding one has been as ambitious as Professor
Sharfman's projected four-volue work on the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, of which the first two volumes have appeared. The Interstate
Commerce Commission is of all American administrative agencies the one
with the longest and most honorable history and with the largest aggregate
of powers. Again it is not possible in a review such as this to go into
details regarding Professor Sharfman's treatment of his subject. Suffice
it to say that on the legal side his survey of the powers of the Commission
and its relation to the courts leaves little to be desired, while his estimate
of the usefulness of the Commission as a device for controlling the trans-
portation industry is enlightened by the equipment which he brings to his
study in his capacity of economist. The possibilities of bureaucratic con-
trol of private enterprise are nowhere better revealed than in these two
volumes.
RALPH F. FUCHS.
Washington University School of Law.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE PERMANENT COURT
OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, by Hugh Lauterpacht. New York: Longmans,
Green and Co., 1934, pp. IX, 112.
This volume consists of a series of lectures delivered at the Graduate
Institute of International Studies at Geneva. It is a significant contribu-
tion based upon an exhaustive study of the judgments and advisory opinions
of the Permanent Court of International Justice. With the major aim of
the Court as one of several instruments for the maintenance of peace, the
author is concerned only incidentally, in part because there is no exact way
of even estimating the extent to which the Court has been successful in
performing this function. He concentrates on the second basic function of
the Court and attempts to measure and evaluate the work of the Court in
the development of international law.
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While the work of the Court thus far has consisted to a very large ex-
tent of the interpretation of treaties and other international documents
and the international commitments upon which its own jurisdiction is based,
it does not follow that the Court has had no occasion to concern itself with
the principles of general and customary international law, for in the search
for dependable guides to the meaning of treaty stipulations and the inten-
tion of the parties to international agreements, these principles are among
the most potent of sources. In using them, the Court has naturally prac-
ticed a degree of caution commensurate with the weightiness of the cases
that come before it and the voluntary character of its jurisdiction in con-
troversies between sovereign states.
As the judges of the Court apply these general principles and maxims,
it is as true of them as it is of municipal judges that "It is not their
function deliberately to change the law so as to make it conform with their
own views of justice and expediency. This does not mean that they do not
in fact shape or even alter the law. But they do it without admitting it;
they do it while guided at the same time by existing law; they do it while
remembering that stability and certainty are no less the soul of law than
justice; they do it, in a word, with caution."
"Judicial legislation is, ultimately, not a change of the law, but the
fulfillment of its purpose." The Permanent Court of International Justice,
as does every municipal court in the sphere of municipal law, interprets
the law to make it effective---"to secure a full degree of effectiveness of
international law, and in particular of the obligations undertaken by the
parties in treaties."
The Court from the outset has made clear that it will not permit itself
to be held in bondage by technicalities. Here is its own language from the
Mavrommatis Palestine Concession case: "The Court, whose jurisdiction is
international, is not bound to attach to matters of form the same degree of
importance which they might possess in municipal law." In the absence of
procedural provisions in its own statute and rules, the Court regarded itself
"at liberty to adopt the principle which it considers best calculated to
ensure the administration of justice, most suited to procedure before an
international tribunal, and most in conformity with the fundamental prin-
ciples of international law."
"If any lesson can be derived from the experience of the last twelve
years," writes the author, "then it is this: that Governments cannot rely
on the Court that it will countenance evasion from the vincula, juris into
which they have entered."
The Court adjudicates disputes between states, but the law which it
applies is law to which the states themselves are parties, either expressly
or tacitly, and, consequently, no encroachment on the sovereignty of the
state is involved. The Court's language in the Wimbledon case is clear on
this point: "The Court declines to see in the conclusion of any Treaty by
which a State undertakes to perform or refrain from performing a par-
ticular act an abandonment of its sovereignty. No doubt any convention
creating an obligation of this kind places a restriction upon the exercise
of the sovereign rights of the State, in the sense that it requires them
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to be exercised in a certain way. But the right of entering into international
engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty." And similarly in the
Lotus case: "International law governs relations between independent
States. The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their
own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted
as expressing principles of law." The author makes this enlightening com-
ment: "The curbing of some cherished claims of State sovereignty is the
result of submission to jurisdiction, and not of any usurpation of powers
on the part of the Court."
Professor Lauterpacht has produced a scholarly and readable volume
which merits the attention of all who have either a general or a special
interest in international law or the World Court-or, for that matter, in
the general problem of judicial legislation.
Washington University. ARNOLD J. LIEN.
COMO S HIzo LA CONSTITUTION DE; CUBA, by Antonio Bravo V Corrnaso.
La Habana: Rambla, Bouza y Ca., 1928. 113 pp.
BASES PARA UNA CONSTITUTION FUNCTIONAL, by Oscar Alvarez Andrews.
Santiago de Chile: The Author, 1932. 125 pp.
These two little works on constitution making are about as different as
they well could be. The former, by a member of the Cuban senate, is
patriotic and historical in character. It is very clearly and simply put, so
that even high school students could grasp its contents. After a brief sum-
mary of the achievement of the independence of Cuba, and an incidental
criticism of the United States for making the treaty of liberation without
consulting Cuba on terms of equality (p. 9), the author proceeds to analyze
the form of government and to give a circumstantial account of the debates
and decisions of the constituent assembly (of which he was secretary) in
framing the constitution. This account is very interesting and provides a
very good picture of how such assemblies work. Of course the main pro-
visions of the constitution are explained. In discussing the Platt Amend-
ment and intervention some further repressed antagonisms against the
United States are mildly displayed.
Alvarez' book is concerned with what should be rather than with what
is in the Chilean constitution. He takes a decidedly liberal, although not a
doctrinaire, viewpoint, and treats his subject matter from the standpoints
of (1) fundamental principles, (2) functional organization, (3) effective
public opinion. He is well read in the recent European literature of func-
tional democratic government. The book is really a handbook for the stu-
dent of constitution making and for the more intelligent type of citizen and
is constructed largely in outline with terse, pointed definitions and state-
ments of principles. It should serve its function well. We have nothing
just like it in this country and the work most similar to it in Great Britain
is Sidney and Beatrice Webb's Socizlist Constitution for Great Britain-
although the two books are by no means wholly comparable. Alvarez' book
is much more terse and provocative. He is not content merely with a state-
ment of the principles of government which a constitution should embody.
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